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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-six states in 2014 joined a lawsuit challenging the implementation 
of President Barack H. Obama’s immigration program to defer certain
deportation consequences for particular subsets of immigrants and residents.1 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the states 
had standing to participate in the lawsuit because Texas—by itself—satisfied
the rigors of Article III.2  In another lawsuit filed in 2017, certain states, 
organizations, and individuals challenged President Donald J. Trump’s
executive orders on immigration.3  Although the Ninth Circuit addressed
the standing component for each plaintiff,4 in another case involving a
different group of plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit followed the approach 
taken by the Fifth Circuit, satisfying the constitutional inquiry based on the
status of one of several plaintiffs.5  To refresh, Article III circumscribes the
1. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Twenty-six states . . .
challenged DAPA under the Administrative Procedure Act . . . and the Take Care Clause
of the Constitution; in an impressive and thorough Memorandum Opinion and Order issued
February 16, 2015, the district court enjoined the program on the ground that the states are 
likely to succeed on their claim that DAPA is subject to the APA’s procedural requirements.” 
(footnotes omitted)).
2. Id. at 155, 162 (“At least one state—Texas—has satisfied the first standing requirement 
by demonstrating that it would incur significant costs in issuing driver’s licenses to DAPA 
beneficiaries. . . .  The states have standing.”).
3. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 760 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“The State 
of Hawai’i . . . filed a motion for a TRO seeking to enjoin EO1, which the District of 
Hawai’i did not rule on because of the nationwide TRO entered in the Western District of
Washington.  After EO2 issued, the State filed an amended complaint challenging EO2 in
order ‘to protect its residents, its employers, its educational institutions, and its sovereignty.’
Dr. Elshikh, the Imam of the Muslim Association of Hawai’i, joined the State’s challenge
because the Order ‘inflicts a grave injury on Muslims in Hawai’i, including Dr. Elshikh, 
his family, and members of his Mosque.’  In 2015, Dr. Elshikh’s wife filed an I-130 Petition
for Alien Relative on behalf of her mother—Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law—a Syrian national
living in Syria.”); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 577 (4th Cir.
2017) (“This action was brought by six individuals, all American citizens or lawful permanent 
residents who have at least one family member seeking entry into the United States from
one of the Designated Countries, and three organizations that serve or represent Muslim 
clients or members.”); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(“Two days later, Washington’s Complaint was amended to add the State of Minnesota as
a plaintiff and to add a claim under the Tenth Amendment.”).
4. Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 762–66 (analyzing separately the standing of Dr. Elshikh
and Hawaii); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1161 (analyzing the claims of both Washington and 
Minnesota and “conclud[ing] that the States have alleged harms to their proprietary interests 
traceable to the Executive Order”).
5. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 586 (“And because we find that at
least one Plaintiff possesses standing, we need not decide whether the other individual 
Plaintiffs or the organizational Plaintiffs have standing with respect to this claim.”).
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exercise of federal jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.6  A party
has standing if a case or controversy exists; the absence of standing 
renders a judicial decision an unconstitutional advisory opinion.7 
The idea that just one plaintiff needs to satisfy Article III for a lawsuit 
to proceed is sometimes called the one-good-plaintiff rule.8  This maxim
is so paradigmatic that a slight refinement to the law could destabilize 
multi-plaintiff lawsuits, forcing claimants to clamor over demonstrating
their personal attachment to the dispute.9 
Though disagreements exist over how accessible courts should be,10 the
aforementioned immigration-policy cases demonstrate that a searching 
probe into standing among all plaintiffs will affect interests attendant to 
both conservative and progressive advocacy.  No matter the partisan
inclination—as 2017 challenges to the remnants of the Obama Administration’s 
immigration policies demonstrate—plaintiffs of all types sometimes want
to band together.11  And when that happens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer reminds
 6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1547 (2016) (“Although the Constitution does not fully explain what is meant by ‘the 
judicial Power of the United States,’ it does specify that this power extends only to ‘Cases’ 
and ‘Controversies.’” (citations omitted)).
7. See Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 679 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“If either the plaintiff or the defendant ceases to have a concrete interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, there is no longer a live case or controversy.  A federal court that 
decides the merits of such a case runs afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions.”). 
8. Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Preview: Standing for Intervention, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 10, 2017, 3:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/argument­
preview-standing-intervention/ [https://perma.cc/6RZQ-NRCN] [hereinafter Wasserman,
Argument Preview] (“The second is from Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, a professor at William & 
Mary Law School.  Bruhl urges the court to go one step further and reject the ‘one good 
plaintiff’ rule in favor of requiring that all participating plaintiffs demonstrate standing in
all cases, even when all plaintiffs present the same issues and seek the same remedies.”).
9. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998); Sec’y
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 312 n.3 (1984); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–64 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187
(1973).
10. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Given these safeguards against undue interference by the Judiciary in times of war or
national-security emergency, the Court’s abolition, or limitation of, Bivens actions goes too far.
If you are cold, put on a sweater, perhaps an overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but 
do not set fire to the house.”); Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1521, 1522 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (“Prisoners possess a ‘constitutional right of access to the courts.’” (quoting 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977))). 
11. Lyle Denniston, States Seek End of Last Parts of Obama Immigration Orders, 
NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 30, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/states-seek-end­
of-last-parts-of-obama-immigration-orders [https://perma.cc/GL5S-QSCG] (“Ten of the
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that today’s win could be tomorrow’s loss: “After all, in the law, what is
sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.”12 
On June 5, 2017, in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., the Supreme 
Court clarified the one-good-plaintiff rule, concluding that when parties 
assert remedies in their name, those parties must satisfy an individualized
standing inquiry.13 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr. made manifest that, in the context of intervenors of right under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), third-party intervenors seeking relief
different from extant plaintiffs must have Article III standing to join the
lawsuit.14  This principle, Justice Alito explained, applies each time “the 
plaintiff and the intervenor seek separate money judgments in their own
names.”15  Stated differently, plaintiffs and prospective intervenors pursuing
mirror-image legal theories must have individualized standing if they seek
a separate damages award.16  The Court vacated and remanded because the
record was unclear as to whether the intervenor was “seeking damages for
itself or is simply seeking the same damages sought by [the original
plaintiff].”17 
Town of Chester and its refinement of the one-good-plaintiff rule received 
little attention among commentators.18  Although the Court mandated standing
for parties seeking novel relief, the Court was reticent about whether standing 
is irrelevant for existing parties seeking relief in a singular name.  The remand
order could be viewed as acquiescing to one party satisfying Article III
when all damages are the same, but that conclusion is quixotic for multi-
plaintiff lawsuits in which each plaintiff wants a slice of the pie.  When 
Justice Alito prescribed that “[f]or all relief sought, there must be a litigant 
states that had succeeded in a sweeping challenge to President Obama’s 2014 order that 
would have delayed deportation of more than 4 million undocumented immigrants acted
on Thursday to force an end to a similar 2012 Obama order to protect about 1 million
younger immigrants.”).
12.  Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016). 
13. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017) (“The parties do not dispute—and we hold—that 
such an intervenor must meet the requirements of Article III if the intervenor wishes to
pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff.”).
14. Id. at 1651. 
15. Id.
 16. Id. (“That principle dictates the disposition of this case. It is unclear whether
Laroe seeks the same relief as Sherman or instead seeks different relief, such as a money
judgment against the Town in Laroe’s own name.”). 
17. Id. at 1652. 
18. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Act on Voting Rights and Cellphone Privacy, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/us/politics/us-supreme­
court-affirms-north-carolina-districts-rely-too-much-on-race.html?rref=collection%2Fby
line%2Fadam-liptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module 
=stream_unit&version=search&contentPlacement=10&pgtype=collection (covering other opinions 
and orders released that day, while neglecting any discussion of Town of Chester). 
708
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with standing,” the one-good-plaintiff rule became the one-good-remedy
rule.19  And that small change could have big consequences.
This Article argues that Town of Chester reframes the one-good-plaintiff 
rule, turning an inquiry focused on at least one plaintiff with standing for
each asserted claim into one in which courts must assay standing for the 
entire field of damages seekers.  In three parts, the Article reviews Article
III standing juxtaposed with the advent of the one-good-plaintiff rule, 
discusses Town of Chester, and explores how Town of Chester affects the
future of the one-good-plaintiff rule.  Although Town of Chester did not 
address existing plaintiffs or how their extant damages theories can anchor 
other parties, the Court’s rationale is a salvo against the idea that a lawsuit
can proceed based on one plaintiff’s standing.  By focusing on the need to 
separate plaintiffs attendant to whether damages are sought collectively 
or individually, Town of Chester will force plaintiffs to craft and solidify 
damages theories early in litigation without the benefit of discovery. Town 
of Chester presages more narrowly tailored injunctions, nudging against
the continued utility of nationwide preliminary injunctions. Town of Chester 
also could limit access to the courts for certain types of lawsuits,20 like 
politicized cases challenging executive policies.  By demanding fulsome 
analysis on all plaintiffs, courts no doubt will face ineluctable administrative
burdens each time they must satisfy themselves of not encroaching upon 
an advisory opinion for a party without standing.  The upshot is a shift from
who has standing to how certain relief is supported by standing. Town of
Chester offers a minor adjustment with major implications, reconstructing 
the one-good-plaintiff rule into the one-good-remedy rule. 
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND THE ONE-GOOD-PLAINTIFF RULE
Article III limits the exercise of judicial power to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”21  This axiom preserves the “tripartite structure” of the
federal government, preventing the judiciary from “intrud[ing] upon the
powers given to the other branches” and “confin[ing] the federal courts to
 19. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1651. 
20. Cf. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to
large multistate or multinational corporations that operate across many jurisdictions.
Under its reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject 
to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of 
incorporation.”).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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a properly judicial role.”
les appreciation of t
22  Understanding the fundamentals of Article III 
he one-good-plaintiff rule’s inception. 
A. Federal Courts are Limited to Cases or Controversies
Chief Justice John Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison that “[t]he
judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under
the constitution.”23  That admonition about the judiciary begins and ends 
with whether an actual case exists, with no exceptions.  Over 200 years 
later, the Supreme Court has not equivocated that “[i]f a dispute is not a
proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or 
expounding the law in the course of doing so.”24  Indulging such an explication
would be an unconstitutional advisory opinion.25  “No principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government 
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual
cases or controversies.”26 
When a federal court determines that a party lacks standing, it must dismiss
that case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because it lacks the 
constitutional power to hear the case.27  The fulcrum of any standing inquiry 
is whether a plaintiff has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.”28  This inquiry resolves “whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or particular 
issues.”29 
At its “irreducible constitutional minimum,” Article III standing requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate injury, causation, and redressability:
22.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
23.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
24.  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). 
25. See Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 679 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“If either the plaintiff or the defendant ceases to have a concrete interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, there is no longer a live case or controversy.  A federal court that 
decides the merits of such a case runs afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions.”). 
26.  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); see also Home Builders Ass’n of Miss. v. City of 
Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A case is properly dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.” (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 
1187 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
28.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
29.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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(1) an injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a “legally
protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e., a “fairly traceable” connection between the 
alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability
(i.e., it is “likely” and not “merely speculative” that the plaintiff’s injury will be
remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing lawsuit).30 
These three elements are the constitutional bulwark to ensure a court is 
competent to hear a case.31  More than pleading requirements, they are “an
indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case,” in which “each element must
be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof.”32 
Cases from October Terms 2015 and 2016 have enriched how courts view 
a cognizable injury in fact.33 An asserted injury must be both concrete and 
particularized.34  Particularized harm “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.”35  Concrete harm is harm that “actually exist[s],”
irrespective of whether it is tangible or intangible.36  And it cannot be overstated
that “a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’”37 
Congress can confer standing by defining aggrieved persons to whom
statutory protection is entitled.38  Private individuals, for example, have 
standing to sue on behalf of the government as qui tam relators when a 
statute deputizes individuals to investigate and vindicate sovereign injuries.39 
As the Court has reflected, “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, [and] its judgment is 
30. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2008)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)); see also Pub. Citizen, 
Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the injury requirement, 
which is one of three requirements for standing). 
31. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 
32. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 
441 U.S. 91, 114–15 (1979) (construing statutory prescriptions to determine who constitutes an
aggrieved person for standing purposes). 
33. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
34. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 
35. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). 
36. Id. at 1548–49. 
37.  Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017). 
38. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017). 
39. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787– 
88 (2000) (“We hold that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on 
behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does 
not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in such actions.” (citation omitted)).
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also instructive and important.”40  Still the Court has cautioned that statutory 
violations alone do not confer standing.41  Allegations of “a bare procedural
violation, divorced from any concrete harm” cannot buoy a statutory violation 
into a justiciable violation.42  Difficulty in proving or quantifying harm should
not obstruct an argument for standing; yet bare procedural violations alone 
require “additional harm” flowing from the violation.43 
Certain entities have the capacity to assume and acquire standing for a 
group of injured individuals.44  Unions generally have standing as representatives
of aggrieved employees seeking judicial recourse.45  Doctors have standing
in certain instances to sue on behalf of their patients.46 Even vendors of beer
can sometimes sue on behalf of their patrons.47 
Standing, at bottom, answers who can sue in federal court and what kinds
of claims can be heard.48 Bald injuries dispersed among many create 
justiciable cases or controversies for all injured parties, not in thrall to the 
existence or whim of one particular party with standing.49  Mass injuries
comport with the idea that common injuries inure to a common lawsuit: “The 
fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people does not 
of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The victims’ 
injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely shared, to be sure, but 
each individual suffers a particularized harm.”50
 40. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
41. Id.
 42. Id.
 43. See id.
 44. See id. at 1548 n.7. 
45. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 
517 U.S. 544, 549 (1996) (“Since the union is the ‘representative of employees aggrieved,’ 
it is a person who may sue on behalf of the ‘persons similarly situated’ in order to ‘enforce
such liability.’”).
46. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (“We conclude, however, 
that the physician-appellants, who are Georgia-licensed doctors consulted by pregnant 
women, also present a justiciable controversy and do have standing despite the fact that
the record does not disclose that any one of them has been prosecuted, or threatened with 
prosecution, for violation of the State’s abortion statutes.”).
47. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–93 (1976) (“The question thus 
arises whether appellant Whitener, the licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, who has a live controversy
against enforcement of the statute, may rely upon the equal protection objections of males
18–20 years of age to establish her claim of unconstitutionality of the age-sex differential.
We conclude that she may.”). 
48. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“A decision
in petitioners’ favor is likely to redress that loss. We accordingly conclude that petitioners 
have standing.”).
49. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (noting that “standing
cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press”).
50.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 n.7 (2016). 
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The still enduring inquiry is what happens when some, but not all, plaintiffs
proffer sufficient allegations to satisfy Article III.  Would exercise of
jurisdiction over the case offend Article III on the basis that some have joined
the bandwagon to root for the team despite the absence of legitimate standalone 
claims?  Are they true fans, or just latecomers to potential success?
B. Fomenting the Idea that One Plaintiff is Good Enough
That at least one plaintiff enables a lawsuit to move forward has become 
axiomatic for federal courts.51  But its journey to that point seems almost
accidental and untested.  An amalgam of cases grafted together demonstrates
that one plaintiff’s satisfaction of standing suffices for all similar claimants, 
and that one good party permits the lawsuit to persist.52  Although the impetus 
and inception of the idea is difficult to discern, starting in the 1970s, the
Supreme Court explicated apace about how one plaintiff alone avails the 
exercise of federal judicial review.53 
In 1973, in Doe v. Bolton, Justice Harry A. Blackmun authored a clear
articulation that one plaintiff with standing can satisfy the case-or-controversy 
requirement of Article III for all plaintiffs.54 “Mary Doe, 23 other individuals 
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as nurses registered
in the State, five as clergymen, and two as social workers), and two nonprofit 
Georgia corporations that advocate abortion reform” filed a lawsuit challenging 
certain portions of Georgia’s statute on abortion procedures.55  When addressing 
the challenge to standing, Justice Blackmun, joined by six other justices,
explained how Doe and the physicians performing abortions have standing,
noting that questionable standing among the other plaintiffs “is perhaps a 
matter of no great consequence.”56 The Court observed that Doe and the 
physicians stand to suffer prospective criminal prosecution and “should not
 51. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) (“Because the superintendent
clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts’ decisions, we need not consider whether
the Legislators also have standing to do so.”).
52. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 
(2006) (“The Court of Appeals did not determine whether the other plaintiffs have standing 
because the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case­
or-controversy requirement.  Because we also agree that FAIR has standing, we similarly
limit our discussion to FAIR.” (citations omitted) (citing Forum for Acad. & Institutional
Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 228 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004))). 
53. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973). 
54. See id.
 55. Id. at 184–85 (footnote omitted). 
56. Id. at 188. 
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be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means
of seeking relief.”57  Justice Blackmun, however, denigrated the claims of 
the nurses, clergy, social workers, and corporations as “another step removed”
from those with standing because their only plausible tie to the case would 
have been as accessories or coconspirators to those dispensing medical
advice.58 
The Court nonetheless reached the merits of the case because one plaintiff 
with standing was good enough:
We conclude that we need not pass upon the status of these additional appellants 
in this suit, for the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by Doe and
the physician-appellants, and nothing is gained or lost by the presence or absence 
of the nurses, the clergymen, the social workers, and the corporations.59 
All plaintiffs succeeded on the merits.60  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and 
Justice William O. Douglas filed concurrences.61  And Justice Byron R. White
and then Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.62  None of them addressed
the analysis on standing. 
Five years later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., writing for himself and 
five other justices of an eight-member court, concluded that standing for 
one plaintiff among many permitted review on the merits.63  Two corporations 
and several individuals challenged the denial of a rezoning request, asserting 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.64 
Observing that the residents and corporations desire different relief under 
different theories of harm, Justice Powell concluded that one good plaintiff 
can support the lawsuit: 
But we need not decide whether the circumstances of this case would justify
departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the constitutional
rights of its prospective minority tenants. For we have at least one individual
plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own.65 
The Court further explained that “the presence of this plaintiff” obviated
the need to “consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs 
57. Id. (citing Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 883, 839–40 (6th Cir. 1971); Poe
v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990–91 (D. Kan. 1972)). 
58. Id. at 189. 
59. Id.
 60. See id. at 194, 198–99, 201. 
61. Id. at 207 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 209 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
62. Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). 
63.  429 U.S. 252, 263–64 & n.9 (1977). 
64. Id. at 254, 258–59.
 65. Id. at 263–64 (citations omitted).
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have standing to maintain the suit.”66  The Court remanded for further review
on the merits.67  The dissents by Justices White and Thurgood Marshall did 
not mention standing.68 
In 1984, in Secretary of the Interior v. California, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor authored a 5–4 opinion about the Department of the Interior’s 
sale of oil and gas leases off the coast of California.69  California, along with
several environmental groups and local governments, sued to enjoin the 
sale of certain tracts of land.70  Without much fanfare or elucidation, the
Court addressed the merits on the basis of California’s standing alone:
“Since the State of California clearly does have standing, we need not address 
the standing of the other respondents, whose position here is identical to 
the State’s.”71 The plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits.72  The dissent 
by Justice John Paul Stevens took no issue with the standing analysis.73 
Although the Court suggested that the positions among the plaintiffs were 
identical, it is less clear whether California alone articulated and represented 
all relief sought among the parties.  As this case suggests, perhaps the one-
good-plaintiff rule is most acute when in the valiance of injuries associated
with state sovereignty, elevating the state to special status as a super plaintiff 
for relief sought by its constituents.74 
Two years later, in Bowsher v. Synar, Chief Justice Burger, joined by four
other justices, addressed “whether [an] assignment by Congress to the
Comptroller General . . . under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 violate[d] the doctrine of separation of powers.”75
 66. Id. at 264 n.9. 
67. Id. at 271 (“Respondents’ complaint also alleged that the refusal to rezone 
violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. They continue to urge here that a 
zoning decision made by a public body may, and that petitioners’ action did, violate § 3604 or
§ 3617. The Court of Appeals, however, proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, 
did not decide the statutory question.  We remand the case for further consideration of 
respondents’ statutory claims.”).
68. See id. at 271–72 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 272–73 (White, J., dissenting). 
69.  464 U.S. 312, 315 (1984). 
70. Id. at 319. 
71. Id. at 319 n.3. 
72. Id. at 343 (“But our review of the history of CZMA § 307(c)(1), and the 
coordinated structures of the amended CZMA and OCSLA, persuade us that Congress did
not intend § 307(c)(1) to mandate consistency review at the lease sale stage.”).
73. See id. at 344–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
74. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157, 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir.
2017) (per curiam). 
75.  478 U.S. 714, 717 (1986). 
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Several members of Congress who voted against the law challenged it on 
grounds of their special status as federal legislators,76 while the National
Treasury Employees Union filed a separate lawsuit alleging “its members
had been injured as a result of the Act’s automatic spending reduction 
provisions, which have suspended certain cost-of-living benefit increases
to the Union’s members.”77  Beyond reasonable dispute the union members
and legislators had distinct injuries and would have been entitled to different
remedies upon success; yet the Court addressed the merits on the basis of
a single union member’s standing:
A threshold issue is whether the Members of Congress, members of the National 
Treasury Employees Union, or the Union itself have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act in question. It is clear that members of the Union, one of
whom is an appellee here, will sustain injury by not receiving a scheduled increase
in benefits.  This is sufficient to confer standing under § 274(a)(2) and Article III.  We 
therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the Union or Members of
Congress.78 
All plaintiffs won on the merits.79  None of the separate opinions, either 
concurring in judgment or dissenting, questioned or challenged this analysis.80 
In 1998, in Clinton v. City of New York, Justice Stevens, writing for himself 
and five other justices, explained how several unions were able to participate
in a lawsuit because of the standing of a city and some healthcare
organizations.81  In two separate lawsuits, one hailing from New York and 
the other from Idaho, the plaintiffs challenged certain actions by President 
William J. Clinton and his officials on grounds that canceling direct spending
and limited tax benefits to some healthcare programs violated the Presentment
Clause of Article I.82  The New York case involved “the City of New York, 
two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health
care employees.”83  Justice Stevens noted that the city and healthcare 
organizations were injured because both “will be assessed by the State for 
substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have 
to make to the Federal Government.”84  Although the Court did not expound 
on standing for the unions, the justices proceeded to the merits of the unions’
 76. Id. at 719. 
77. Id.
 78. Id. at 721 (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 736 (“We conclude that the District Court correctly held that the powers 
vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate the command of the Constitution
that the Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws.”). 
80. Id. at 736–37 (Stevens, J., concurring), 759 (White, J., dissenting), 776–77 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
81.  524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998). 
82. Id. at 421, 425–26. 
83. Id. at 425. 
84. Id. at 431. 
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claims under the following justification: “Because both the City of New 
York and the health care appellees have standing, we need not consider
whether the appellee unions also have standing to sue.”85  Implicit in that 
statement is that the harms alleged and relief sought by the unions differed
from those with standing—otherwise why not include the unions in the 
analysis with the others? All plaintiffs prevailed on the merits.86  Although 
separate opinions were filed, either dissenting or concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, no justice questioned standing for the New Yorkers.87 
That same year, in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, in a complicated ruling in which several justices joined
different parts of opinions to form a majority, Justice O’Connor delivered 
the opinion of the Court in a case involving the Census Bureau’s “plan to 
use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to
address a chronic and apparently growing problem of ‘undercounting’
certain identifiable groups of individuals.”88  The Court reviewed two cases
challenging the plan, one brought by the House of Representatives and
another brought by four counties and the residents of thirteen states.89 
After reviewing expert opinions on how the plan would create “intrastate
vote dilution” across several states, the Court reached the merits “because
the record before us amply supports the conclusion that several of the
appellees have met their burden of proof regarding their standing to bring 
this suit.”90  The totality of the standing analysis focused on the plight of one 
Indiana resident alongside expert extrapolations.91  The plaintiffs won on
 85. Id. at 431 n.19. 
86. Id. at 448–49 (“Third, our decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures 
authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution.”). 
87. See, e.g., id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my
view, the Snake River appellees lack standing to challenge the President’s cancellation of
the ‘limited tax benefit,’ and the constitutionality of that action should not be addressed.  I 
think the New York appellees have standing to challenge the President’s cancellation of
an ‘item of new direct spending’; I believe we have statutory authority (other than the 
expedited-review provision) to address that challenge; but unlike the Court I find the 
President’s cancellation of spending items to be entirely in accord with the Constitution.”).
88.  525 U.S. 316, 320 (1999). 
89. Id. at 327–28. 
90. Id. at 330, 334. 
91. See id. at 331–34 (“Appellee Hofmeister’s expected loss of a Representative to
the United States Congress undoubtedly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of Article 
III standing.”).
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the merits.92  None of the separate opinions challenged the standing analysis.93 
And even in dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Breyer, disagreed with the merits but nevertheless noted that “at least
one of the plaintiffs in each of these cases has standing.”94 
In 2006, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, made a 
limited inquiry into standing to resolve a case about whether law schools can
restrict visits by military recruiters based on the schools’ free-speech rights 
under First Amendment.95  Two sentences contained the entirety of the reticent 
standing analysis: 
The Court of Appeals did not determine whether the other plaintiffs have standing
because the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement.  Because we also agree that [the association of law
schools and law faculties] has standing, we similarly limit our discussion to [the
association].96 
The plaintiffs lost on the merits “[b]ecause Congress could require law schools 
to provide equal access to military recruiters without violating the schools’
freedoms of speech or association.”97 
That same year, the Court released DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
clarifying that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he
seeks to press.”98  In a case about whether taxpayers have standing to
challenge certain Ohio tax breaks for auto manufacturers by arguing those 
incentives violated the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Roberts delivered
the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that the taxpayers did not have 
standing to sue in federal court.99  The Court reasoned that the taxpayers
could not challenge the state tax “by virtue of their status as taxpayers,” 
on grounds similar to an Establishment Clause challenge, or as municipal
taxpayers.100  Piecing together precedent, the Chief Justice reified that
“a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief
 92. Id. at 343 (“For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Census Act prohibits 
the proposed uses of statistical sampling in calculating the population for purposes
of apportionment.”). 
93. See id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part), 350 (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
95.  547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006). 
96. Id. at 52 n.2 (citation omitted) (citing Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights v.
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 228 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004)).
97. Id. at 70. 
98.  547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
99. Id. at 332, 338. 
100. Id. at 346, 349, 354. 
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sought.”101  Justice Ginsburg authored a concurrence in part and concurrence
in judgment, suggesting that taxpayer lawsuits are nonjusticiable in 
themselves.102 Although previous cases hinted that standing is required
for each form of relief sought, DaimlerChrysler made that point unequivocal.103 
One year later, in a case all about standing, the Court again relied on
without criticism the one-good-plaintiff rule in Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency.104 Twelve states, four local governments, and a slew of 
private organizations alleged that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) “ha[d] abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate
the emissions of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide.”105  Writing 
for four other justices, Justice Stevens endorsed the one-good-plaintiff
rule: “In response, EPA, supported by 10 intervening States and six trade 
associations, correctly argued that we may not address those two questions
unless at least one petitioner has standing to invoke our jurisdiction under 
Article III of the Constitution.”106  After stating the rule that “[o]nly one of
the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the petition 
for review,”107 the Court reflected that Massachusetts is entitled to special
solicitude “in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests.”108  With analysis limited 
to Massachusetts only, the plaintiffs prevailed in arguing that the EPA 
failed to follow federal law when refusing to regulate certain emissions: 
In sum—at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits—the rise in 
sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will continue
to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless
real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief
they seek.  We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge EPA’s 
denial of their rulemaking petition.109 
Although expressing disagreement with the outcome, the two dissents 
were sanguine about the one-good-plaintiff rule.  Chief Justice Roberts 
conceded that organizations can latch onto one good member to satisfy
standing: “Just as an association suing on behalf of its members must show
 101. Id. at 352 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). 
102. Id. at 354–55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
103. See id. at 352. 
104. 
105. 





Id. at 518. 
108. Id. at 520. 
109. Id. at 526. 
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not only that it represents the members but that at least one satisfies Article
III requirements, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens 
patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”110  Justice Antonin 
Scalia in dissent likewise did not asperse the one-good-plaintiff rule.111 
By 2009, in Horne v. Flores, Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by four 
other justices, recapped what had become axiomatic: “Here, as in all 
standing inquiries, the critical question is whether at least one petitioner 
has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.’”112  A group of English 
language-learner students and their parents filed a declaratory-judgment 
action against Arizona, its legislative board of education, and a school 
superintendent, alleging that Arizona was violating the Equal Educational 
Opportunities Act of 1974.113 In a posture in which the Court addressed the
standing of defendants to appeal from the entry of an injunction, Justice Alito
discussed why the standing analysis need go no further than the superintendent: 
“Because the superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower 
courts’ decisions, we need not consider whether the Legislators also have 
standing to do so.”114  Justice Alito also suggested that this status enabled the
superintendent to challenge orders that applied to him as well as others.115 
The Court remanded the case for further review on the merits.116 Justice
Breyer’s dissent did not question that “at least one plaintiff” makes a lawsuit.117 
The one-good-plaintiff rule has been justified on administrative grounds
and for pragmatic reasons.118  Resolving standing for one party prevents
courts from the burdensome and possibly cumulative review of the same
 110. Id. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
112. 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
493 (2009)).
113. Id. at 439–40. 
114. Id. at 446. 
115. Id. at 446 n.2 (“We do not agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals 
that ‘the Superintendent’s standing is limited’ to seeking vacatur of the District Court’s orders
‘only as they run against him.’  Had the superintendent sought relief based on satisfaction 
of the judgment, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion might have been correct.  But . . . petitioners’
Rule 60(b)(5) claim is not based on satisfaction of the judgment.  Their claim is that continued
enforcement of the District Court’s orders would be inequitable. This claim implicates the
orders in their entirety, and not solely as they run against the superintendent.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
116. Id. at 472 (“We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the 
cases for the District Court to determine whether, in accordance with the standards set out
in this opinion, petitioners should be granted relief from the judgment.”). 
117. See id. at 472–516 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
118. See, e.g., California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), 
rev’d on other grounds, Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
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arguments without differing presentations.119  That purposive justification 
rationalizes that “[a]llowing additional parties to present the same arguments
would not affect the outcome of [the] case.”120  Administrative burdens also 
accumulate because remand on isolated grounds for a few plaintiffs “would 
constitute a waste of scarce judicial resources.”121 
As the cases above suggest, whether the plaintiffs win or lose on the merits
does not change the calculus for discerning whether a case or controversy 
exists for many on the basis of one.  These cases edify that an actual case 
or controversy requires just one plaintiff with standing for each form of relief 
sought.  Town of Chester clarified whether a form of relief is the same when 
different parties seek individualized damages under the same legal theory. 
III. TOWN OF CHESTER: NOT JUST A CASE ABOUT INTERVENORS
Effacing as a case about the requirements to intervene as of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), Town of Chester is a stalking horse 
whose effects may commandeer the one-good-plaintiff rule.  Rule 24 permits 
parties to intervene in a lawsuit, facilitating participation, in full or in part, 
as an original party.122  Parties can invoke Rule 24(a) to intervene as of
right by showing (1) “an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute,”
or (2) “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest.”123  Nongovernmental third 
parties can seek permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) by showing (1) 
“a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute,” or (2) “a claim or defense 
that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”124  In 
119. See id. (“Our review of the more than one thousand pages of the eighteen briefs 
filed in this case, as well as the extensive argument and our own research, convince us that
no stone was left unturned in presenting all aspects of the CZMA issue to this court.”).
120. Id.
 121. Id.
 122. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 378, 
383 (1987) (“First, restrictions on participation may also be placed on an intervenor of 
right and on an original party.  If we were to accept CNA’s theory of constructive denial, 
then it would follow that an intervenor of right also could appeal restrictions placed on its 
participation as a constructive denial of the right to intervene.  And if an intervenor of right
is to be afforded such an appeal, there is no reason to deny an appeal to an original party.”
(footnote omitted)).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). 
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1986, in Diamond v. Charles, the Court declined to decide whether intervenors 
of right must have Article III standing before they can intervene in an
existing lawsuit.125  The Court returned to that question in Town of Chester.126 
Due in part to the development of the parties’ arguments and rationale 
undergirding the Court’s eventual opinion, a case about intervenors could 
shape the contours of who gets to be a plaintiff. 




Around 2000, Steven Sherman sought approval from the town of Chester, 
New York, to develop a 400-acre plot of land into a residential subdivision.127 
Chester allegedly stymied the project by enacting zoning regulations with
the effect of frustrating the approval process.128  In 2003, Sherman agreed
to sell Laroe Estates, Inc. three parcels from the 400 acres for $6 million,
with full payment contingent on approval of the project.129  Laroe made
$2.5 million in interim payments before a bank foreclosed on the property.130 
Around 2008, Sherman filed a takings lawsuit in state court against Chester 
and two of its municipal boards.131  After removal to U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, District Judge Edgardo Ramos 
dismissed the lawsuit as unripe.132  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed and remanded for further review of the alleged taking.133 
125. 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1986) (“However, the precise relationship between the 
interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to
anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals.  We need not decide today whether a party
seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.” (footnote omitted)).
126. See Kate Howard, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 2, 2017, 11:13 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/petition-of-the-day-1065/ [https://perma.cc/M4Q9-KJGU]. 
127. Wasserman, Argument Preview, supra note 8; Howard M. Wasserman, Opinion
Analysis: Standing, Intervention and a Narrow Disposition, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2017, 
2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-standing-intervention­
narrow-disposition/ [https://perma.cc/UP5B-A5K2] [hereinafter Wasserman, Opinion Analysis].
128. Wasserman, Argument Preview, supra note 8. 
129. Wasserman, Opinion Analysis, supra note 127. 
130. Id.
 131. Wasserman, Argument Preview, supra note 8. 
132. Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 12 Civ. 647 (ER), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
38774, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013) (“Because the case was brought before this Court
by removal and the Court no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction, the case is remanded 
to state court.”).
133. Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 569 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because the 
Williamson County ripeness requirements are satisfied, we VACATE the District Court’s
decision to the extent it dismissed Sherman’s federal non-takings claims solely on ripeness 
grounds. On remand, the District Court may consider whether Sherman has sufficiently
stated those claims.”). 
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At that point, Sherman had passed away and the lawsuit involved only
Sherman’s estate—through Steven’s wife, Nancy J. Sherman—as adverse to 
Chester.134 
Upon return to the district court, Laroe moved to intervene as of right 
as a plaintiff adverse to Chester “on the basis that as holder of ‘equitable 
title’ to [the property], Laroe is the owner of the property.”135  Judge Ramos 
denied the motion as “futile” because Laroe lacked standing.136  Although 
unclear whether the outcome relied on application of state law, federal
law, or some combination of the two, Judge Ramos explained that as a
vendee to a contract for the purchase of real property, Laroe did not have 
standing because it was not the owner of an interest in property at the time
of the taking.137  Status as a holder of equitable interest likewise did not confer
standing, Judge Ramos observed, because the legal relationship in that instance
was between Laroe and Sherman—not Laroe and Chester.138 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that intervenors 
of right are not required to demonstrate standing to participate in a lawsuit.139 
Circuit Judge Raymond J. Lohier explained that intervenors did not need
to demonstrate standing because the existence of an Article III case or
controversy already existed through the underlying lawsuit.140  Judge Lohier
cited several Supreme Court cases touching on the issue, albeit obliquely: 
“So it is fair to say that while the Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed
our approach, it has sub silentio permitted parties to intervene in cases that
satisfy the ‘case or controversy’ requirement without determining whether
those parties independently have standing.”141  Declining to approbate the
134. Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 12 Civ. 647 (ER), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43322, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“Mr. Sherman passed away in October 2013. 
His widow, Nancy J. Sherman has replaced him as the Plaintiff.  For conformity with past
decisions, this Court refers to . . . Plaintiff by using masculine pronouns.”). 
135. Id. at *3. 
136. Id. at *39 (“Although legal futility is not mentioned in Rule 24, courts have held
that futility is a proper basis for denying a motion to intervene.” (citing In re Merrill Lynch 
& Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1484 (JFK), 02 Civ. 8472 (JFK), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53923, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009))). 
appeal we consider whether a proposed intervenor must demonstrate that it has standing 
137. Id. at *40–42. 
138. Id. at *41. 
139. Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In this 
even when there is a genuine case or controversy between the existing parties that satisfies
the requirements of Article III of the Constitution.  The answer is no.”).
140. Id. at 64 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190–91(2d. Cir. 1978)).
141. Id. at 65. 
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district court’s standing analysis, the panel reflected that “trying to identify 
the precise nature of Laroe’s interest in the property is difficult at this stage 
of the litigation, when the factual record has not been fully developed.”142 
The court therefore remanded for purposes of determining in the first instance 
whether Laroe met the requirements of Rule 24(a) “separate and apart
from the question of whether it would have standing in its own right.”143 
Just under three weeks before the nomination of Justice Neil M. Gorsuch 
to fill the seat of Justice Scalia,144 the Supreme Court granted a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit.145  The Court agreed to hear
“[w]hether intervenors participating in a lawsuit as of right under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) must have Article III standing (as three
circuits have held), or whether Article III of the Constitution is satisfied
so long as there is a valid case or controversy between the named parties 
(as seven circuits have held).”146  The Court granted the acting solicitor 
general’s motion for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae,147 
but denied the motion of Sherman’s estate requesting leave to be added as 
a respondent and to participate in oral argument.148 
Briefing on the merits focused on whether standing was indispensable 
for intervenors of right.149  Chester argued that intervenors of right must
have standing in all instances because standing both constrains the range
of litigants who can invoke judicial power and alleviates the burdens on 
litigants.150  Article III demands, said Chester, that exercise of judicial 
power and the imposition of burdens should be levied only “at the behest” 
of parties who have concrete and particularized interests in the case.151 
Chester asserted that standing avoids the usurpation of a lawsuit via novel 
claims and procedural demands for a constitutionally nonexistent controversy.
Although supporting Chester in large part, the federal government maintained
that standing is not necessary for intervenors supporting the same claims 
142. Id. at 68. 
143. Id. at 69. 
144. Amy Howe, Trump Nominates Gorsuch To Fill Scalia Vacancy, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 31, 2017, 9:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/trump-nominates-gorsuch­
fill-scalia-vacancy/ [https://perma.cc/2S4H-PLVV].
145. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 810, 811 (2017) (“Petition 
for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted.”). 
146. Howard, supra note 126. 
147.  Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1395, 1395 (2017) (“Motion 
of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae
and for divided argument granted.”). 
148.  Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1222, 1222 (2017) (“Motion 
of Nancy Sherman, Executrix to be added as a respondent and for leave to participate in
oral argument denied.”).
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as the original parties.152  Still both the government and Chester conceded 
that satisfying the rigors of Rule 24(a) would amount to having standing,
insinuating that the question presented could have minor practical effect.153 
While both acknowledged the one-good-plaintiff rule, neither contested
the efficacy of its precepts.154 
Laroe countered that the one-good-plaintiff rule applies because a claimant- 
intervenor is the functional equivalent of a preexisting plaintiff.155  Laroe
maintained that intervenors who are unable to immediately satisfy Article 
III should have the ability to participate in a lawsuit that may eventually
imperil their rights.156  Laroe conceded that a separate standing inquiry is
necessary “when the intervenor seeks to assert new claims or new remedies
beyond those requested by the party with standing.”157  Yet Laroe noted an
inconsistency with that approach, reflecting that intervenor-defendants do 
not need standing.158 
In addition to the federal government, six merits-stage amicus briefs
were filed, two of which presenting unique positions.159 Sherman’s estate 
argued that Laroe should be able to assist in the case—but not intervene.160 
The brief proposed an idiosyncratic solution in which an intervenor of 
right attains “full party status” if it has standing; otherwise the third party 
falls to some inferior status, under which “it is allowed to proceed only to 
the extent it assists or aids the party supported and does not seek to control 
the supported party’s lawsuit.”161  Another brief filed by Professor Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl—through counsel of record at West Virginia-based Bailey 








 159. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog. 
com/case-files/cases/town-of-chester-v-laroe-estates-inc/ [https://perma.cc/N34J-4Z4M]. 
160. See Brief for Plaintiff Nancy Sherman, Executrix, as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Petitioner nor Respondent, Urging Reversal at 13, Town of Chester v. Laroe 
Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (No. 16-605), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/03/16-605-np-amicus-nancy-sherman.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJ9-554S]. 
161. Id. at 4. 
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B. Town of Chester and the Rise of the One-Good-Remedy Rule 
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Town of Chester on April 
17, 2017, with Professor Howard M. Wasserman observing that “[a]ll sides
faced sharp questioning from many corners of the Supreme Court.”164 
Neal Katyal, arguing on behalf of Chester, exhorted (twice) that “standing 
is not dispensed in gross,” explaining that intervenors must have standing
in all instances by implication that existing parties have not represented
sufficiently their interests.165  Katyal noted that courts have greater control
over permissive intervenors, positing that bystanders satisfying Rule 24(a)
without standing could in effect overwhelm litigation.166  Justice Elena Kagan 
expressed interest in whether a difference should exist between “an intervenor 
asserting a claim for relief and one contributing to how the court thinks 
about the case.”167  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer seemed curious
about whether a court had to inquire about standing “at the outset,” or “when
an intervenor sought something more.”168 
Assistant to the Solicitor General Sarah Harrington argued that an intervenor 
must demonstrate standing along with the “statutory requirement of showing 
that current parties cannot adequately represent the would-be intervenor’s
interests.”169  Harrington explained that “no [material] difference [exists]
between intervenor-plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants, because the standing 
of intervenors (unlike that of original plaintiffs) is tied to the potential injury
from the disposition or outcome of the lawsuit.”170 “An intervenor’s standing 
is analyzed much as a defendant’s standing to appeal,” said Harrington, “which
is based on an injury caused by an adverse lower-court judgment.171
 162. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl in Support of
Petitioner at 3–4, Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (No. 16­
605), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/16-605_amicus_pet_professor_
aaron_andrew_p_bruhl.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS5L-F639]. 
163. See id. at 2.
164. Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Analysis: Intervention, Standing and Control 
Over Litigation, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2017, 12:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2017/04/argument-analysis-intervention-standing-control-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/VCG7-
PG3L] [hereinafter Wasserman, Argument Analysis].
165. Id.
 166. See id.
 167. Id.
 168. Id.
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Shay Dvoretzky, on behalf of Laroe, countered that the “constitutionalization 
of every intervention motion” is a “solution in search of a problem.”172 
He reminded the Court that standing serves to prevent courts from issuing 
advisory opinions about actions by the political branches, which does not
compel “micromanag[ing]” discovery.173 Dvoretzky distinguished between
Rule 24(a) and Article III standing, noting that Article III keeps federal
courts from addressing non-live disputes, whereas Rule 24 protects those
who may be affected by live disputes.174 In response to a question from 
Justice Gorsuch, sitting for his first oral argument,175 Dvoretzky explained
that Laroe was not seeking a distinct remedy in this case, just to “maximize”
Sherman’s recovery, in which “Laroe has an interest.”176  When Justice
Gorsuch rejoined that he would be “grateful” if Dvoretzky commented on
whether a distinction exists between “a plaintiff seeking a judgment [in
another’s name] and . . . an intervenor seeking judgment in its own name,”
Dvoretzky continued to tie his answer to the scope of the judgment.177 
Although Justice Gorsuch relented—“I’ll let you go”—Chief Justice 
Roberts redoubled that it is “circular” to suggest that “[an] intervenor can
seek the same relief on the same claim but still exercise [the court’s authority 
to issue] subpoenas beyond what the plaintiff seeks.”178  Dvoretzky also
disagreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s framing of the issue as “whether
or not you’re asking for relief different from someone with a case or
controversy,” positing that the standing inquiry only becomes salient upon 
the presence of a different request for relief by an intervenor.179 
Less than two months later, the Court released Town of Chester on June 




 175. Amy Howe, Justice Neil Gorsuch Takes the Bench, Jumps into the Fray, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2017, 1:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/justice­
neil-gorsuch-takes-bench-jumps-fray/ [https://perma.cc/7KYV-HXA5].




 180. Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Different Shades of Black, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 5, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/view-courtroom-different­
shades-black/ [https://perma.cc/4ZCF-B5SP]. 
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Town of Chester received little press coverage.181  When Justice Alito 
announced the unanimous opinion, members of press purportedly joked 
that the case name reminded them of “Chesty LaRue,” a cheeky name
referenced on Seinfeld and The Simpsons.182  Although the Court vacated
and remanded for further consideration of whether Laroe sought the same 
remedy as Sherman’s estate, its discreet tweak to the one-good-plaintiff 
rule augurs broader implications lying in wait.183 
Justice Alito began with the customary refrain: “At least one plaintiff must 
have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.”184 
That at least one plaintiff with standing is necessary for the continuity of 
a lawsuit is not groundbreaking,185 and the concatenation of one good plaintiff 
to each form of relief is not novel.186  Although the Court need not accept
concessions by the parties for constitutional questions,187 the Court cited 
the briefing alone for those propositions, thereby indicating what had become
evident.188  Justice Alito further exposited that those principles are the 
same for intervenors: “For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with
standing, whether that litigant joins the lawsuit as a plaintiff, a coplaintiff,
or an intervenor of right.”189 
Justice Alito then offered a refinement to what it means to assert different
forms of relief, vacating and remanding for findings on “whether Laroe 
seeks the same relief as Sherman or instead seeks different relief, such as
a money judgment against the Town in Laroe’s own name.”190  The question 
of standing at least applies, according to the Court, when parties seek different 
forms of relief, which includes when the same theory for relief is used to 
181. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Act on Voting Rights and Cellphone Privacy, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/us/politics/us-supreme­
court-affirms-north-carolina-districts-rely-too-much-on-race.html.
182. Walsh, supra note 180; see also Seinfeld: The Gum (NBC television broadcast 
Dec. 14, 1995); The Simpsons: Homer to the Max (Fox television broadcast Feb. 7, 1999). 
183. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648, 1652 (2017)
(“Must a litigant possess Article III standing in order to intervene of right under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)?  The parties do not dispute—and we hold—that such an 
intervenor must meet the requirements of Article III if the intervenor wishes to pursue
relief not requested by a plaintiff. . . .  This confusion needs to be dispelled.  If Laroe wants
only a money judgment of its own running directly against the Town, then it seeks damages 
different from those sought by Sherman and must establish its own Article III standing in
order to intervene.”).
184. Id. at 1651. 
185. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009). 
186. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
187. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2028
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Constitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the
parties’ concessions.”). 
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justify separate damages awards.191  Justice Alito explained that the complaint
is the best evidence for determining relief sought, but acknowledged the
need for flexibility as litigation progresses and the parties’ arguments and
concessions shift.192 The Court made plain the question to answer on remand:
“If Laroe wants only a money judgment of its own running directly against 
the Town, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman
and must establish its own Article III standing in order to intervene.”193 
Interest was scant and the chorus was mute in the wake of the opinion.194 
Professor Wasserman reflected that the opinion suggests—though does 
not make explicit—that “an intervenor need not show standing if its litigation 
activities do not extend beyond asserting the same claim for the same
remedies as the original plaintiff.”195  Lisa Soronen, executive director of 
the State and Local Legal Center, which filed an amicus brief in the case,
conceded that same point, suggesting that “it is unclear whether Laroe Estates
wants the damages Sherman requested (damages for Sherman) or damages
in Laroe Estates’ name.”196  Professor Wasserman also observed two additional
areas in which the Court was reticent: when in the litigation to resolve
intervenor standing, and whether satisfying Rule 24(a) necessarily satisfies 
Article III standing.197  In a supplemental article, Professor Wasserman 
added that the Court left the one-good-plaintiff rule intact.198 Although
accurate, that does not mean Town of Chester failed to speak to the issue.
 191. Id.; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 185 (2000) (“Laidlaw is right to insist that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately
for each form of relief sought.”).
192. See Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1651–52. 
193. Id. at 1652. 
194. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 181 (covering other opinions and orders released 
that day, while neglecting any discussion of Town of Chester).
195. Wasserman, Opinion Analysis, supra note 127. 
196. Lisa Soronen, Supreme Court Rules for City in Standing Case, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG (June 7, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2017/06/07/supreme­
court-rules-for-city-in-standing-case.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XF4-HYCV]. 
197. See Wasserman, Opinion Analysis, supra note 127. 
198. Howard M. Wasserman, SCOTUS Symposium: More on Standing, Intervenors, 
and Laroe Estates, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 5, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs 
blawg/2017/06/scotus-symposium-more-on-standing-intervenors-and-laroe-estates.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZA8T-VD68] [hereinafter Wasserman, SCOTUS Symposium].
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IV. THE RIPPLING EFFECTS OF TOWN OF CHESTER ON 





The ostensibly forgettable Town of Chester bears the overtures of
transforming the one-good-plaintiff rule into a question of whether standing 
exists for each individualized request for relief.  Beyond cavil Town of Chester
treats intervenors of right as synonymous with affirmative claimants.199 The
rules laid out for intervenors of right therefore apply to plaintiffs, absent a
reason for disparate treatment unidentified by the Court.  Although intervenors 
of right differ from permissive intervenors,200 any lesser status for permissive
intervenors due to judicial control is sui generis and foreign to the application 
of parties seeking access to the courts as plaintiffs.  So any future analysis 
of Rule 24(b) for permissive intervenors should not affect how Town of Chester
considered intervenors of right vis-à-vis extant plaintiffs. 
Centering the analysis on relief sought, Town of Chester has ushered in
a new epoch in which the one-good-plaintiff rule has become the one-good- 
remedy rule.  Three not readily discernable consequences emerge involving 
damages, preliminary injunctions, and administrative burdens.  Each will
complicate, to a certain degree, how litigants and courts operate. 
Plaintiffs seeking damages in a singular lawsuit will now need to establish
standing if any claimants wish to pursue relief in their name.  In the past,
organizations, unions, and union members could potentially bring a lawsuit
and rely on only one party’s damages theory to maintain—and sometimes 
win—the case.201 The same was true for complex lawsuits in which housing 
discrimination was alleged by corporate entities and individual residents.202 
Those cases are now in tension with, if not antithetical to, Town of Chester. 
Assuming Town of Chester approbated sub silentio that plaintiffs seeking 
damages under the same name need only show one party with standing, 
for all others in a lawsuit, a demonstration of standing is required for anyone
attempting to cleave damages from the whole.  The effect is a change in the 
calculus for how each plaintiff must justify its own individualized case,
requiring earlier showings of differentiated proof and more precise evidence 
of seemingly attenuated harm.203  Clear victims will remain, but damages
 199. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017). 
200. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 378 (1987). 
201. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 715 (1986). 
202. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
262–64 (1977).
203. Cf. Dahlia Lithwick, The Russia Conspiracy Goes to Court, SLATE (July 13, 
2017, 7:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/ 
democrats_are_suing_the_trump_campaign_for_leaking_their_emails_will_they.html [https://
perma.cc/7TRZ-2DCY] (“The complaint, which relies heavily on newspaper accounts and 
730
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seekers requiring discovery to connect the alleged illicit acts may have to 
wait. And concepts like res judicata and collateral estoppel may prejudice 
would-be plaintiffs seeking complex theories for damages.204 
Grants of preliminary injunctive relief may change as well, limiting 
redressability to the isolated plight of only those who can demonstrate
particularized relief.  Professor Wasserman’s analysis suggests that, after
Town of Chester, injunctions good for one should be good for all:
Enjoining enforcement of a law so A can engage in some conduct (attend an
integrated school, hold a rally, get married, not buy health insurance) is a different 
remedy from enjoining enforcement of a law so B can engage in the “same” conduct
himself. This decision does nothing to end that practice.  Courts generally understand
this type of injunction as the equivalent of a single pie for each party to put to its 
own use, rather than a single order requiring something from the defendant to
each plaintiff.205 
But that conclusion is inconsistent with the admonishment that “[s]tanding is
not dispensed in gross,”206 and it discounts the more nuanced argument
that relief must be tailored to individualized injuries.207  The question is
not whether B can use A’s standing for the same relief, the question is
whether A can obtain particularized relief from which B benefits obliquely. 
If the narrowly tailored injunction as to A makes B whole, then standing
is probably not necessary for B.  But if the court homes in on A to the exclusion 
of B, B will need standing to sue independently to join in the scope of the 
injunction. 
The disquieting impact on equitable relief after Town of Chester is most
pronounced when considering the recent phenomena of nationwide preliminary
injunctions.208  Discounting an individual state’s interest in interstate
current events, details the systematic effort by the Russians to influence the 2016 election. . . .  
One of the principal hurdles for the plaintiffs here will be, as Wright points out, the
sufficiency of the evidence alleged.”).
204. See McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (D.D.C. 1985) (“It is 
especially appropriate to impose sanctions in situations where the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel plainly preclude relitigation of the suit”). 
205. Wasserman, SCOTUS Symposium, supra note 198. 
206. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996)). 
207. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (“Absent such a 
showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent 
with the Art[icle] III limitation.”). 
208. See Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Bray on Reforming the National Injunction, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/academic­
highlight-bray-on-reforming-the-national-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/8VKB-64LM].
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comity, Texas asserted its own injuries alone in the twenty-six state lawsuit 
against the Obama Administration’s immigration policies.209  The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the entry of a nationwide preliminary injunction on the 
basis of Texan injuries.210  Although some suggest that federal laws involving
foreign affairs should be uniform when possible,211 that notion alone does
not supplant the constitutional mandate that federal courts hear and redress
only live cases.  And the only proven case before the Fifth Circuit in that 
instance involved Texas’s grievances.212  The same holds true for the challenges 
to the Trump Administration’s immigration policies.213  Individuals and
organizations have different injuries apart from the states, none of which 
require temporary nationwide relief to redress their personal injuries.  Focusing 
on the Trump Administration’s differing treatment as to refugees in general 
and more specific restrictions on foreign nationals from certain countries, 
fealty to Town of Chester requires exacting orders depending on the foreign 
national’s status.214  That these types of cases are typically preliminary in 
nature necessarily means argument and evidence of individualized irreparable
harm must be proffered before discovery, which further hobbles the legitimacy
and efficacy of nationwide relief. 
Doubtless statutes can be struck down for everyone when a plaintiff
with standing proves that the law is unconstitutional;215 yet Town of Chester
suggests that courts should be circumspect before ordering heavy doses of
relief when the only proven injury can be assuaged through a modest course
209. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Twenty-six states . . .
challenged DAPA under the Administrative Procedure Act . . . and the Take Care Clause
of the Constitution; in an impressive and thorough Memorandum Opinion and Order 
issued February 16, 2015, the district court enjoined the program on the ground that the 
states are likely to succeed on their claim that DAPA is subject to the APA’s procedural
requirements.” (footnotes omitted)). 
210. Id. at 155, 162 (“At least one state—Texas—has satisfied the first standing requirement 
by demonstrating that it would incur significant costs in issuing driver’s licenses to DAPA 
beneficiaries. . . .  The states have standing.”).
211. E.g., Frost, supra note 208. 
212. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146 n.2. 
213. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 586 (4th
Cir. 2017) (“And because we find that at least one Plaintiff possesses standing, we need 
not decide whether the other individual Plaintiffs or the organizational Plaintiffs have 
standing with respect to this claim.”).
214. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (2017) 
(“In addition to the §2(c) suspension of entry, this injunction covered the §6(a) suspension
of refugee admissions, the §6(b) reduction in the refugee cap, and the provisions in §§2 
and 6 pertaining only to internal executive review.”). 
215. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1771 (2017) (“For these reasons, we 
hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed.”).
732
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of treatment.216  Although the immigration cases asserted constitutional
infirmities imperiling the scheme of executive action,217 outside of extreme 
cases with extraordinary allegations, Town of Chester counsels in favor of 
diffidence before entering nationwide relief.218  And as Professor Marty 
Lederman suggests, the scope of preliminary relief is concatenated to which 
courts and which plaintiffs best vindicate a prudent remedy.219 
In Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, a per curiam opinion 
released on the last day of October Term 2016, the Supreme Court harkened 
toward a more refined inquiry consistent with Town of Chester.220  In the
face of reviewing nationwide preliminary injunctions entered on the basis
that the federal government has no interest in pursuing broad-scale unlawful 
actions—even if some plaintiffs might not have standing—the Court granted 
in part the government’s application to stay those injunctions by parsing
 216. Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1864 (2017) (“Yet even a modest extension is
still an extension.”).
217. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 601 (“EO-2 cannot be 
divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it.  In light of
this, we find that the reasonable observer would likely conclude that EO-2’s primary
purpose is to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs. 
We therefore find that EO-2 likely fails Lemon’s purpose prong in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding 
that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”
(footnote omitted)).
218. Josh Blackman, Symposium: Understanding the Supreme Court’s Equitable Ruling
in Trump v. IRAP, SCOTUSBLOG (July 12, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/ 
07/symposium-understanding-supreme-courts-equitable-ruling-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/
X2HH-EAZR] (“If the 4th Circuit is correct that the entire executive order is tainted by
unconstitutional animus, then the government’s interest in enforcing it as to all aliens would
indeed be nonexistent.  The government has no interest in implementing an unconstitutional 
policy, even if certain parties lack standing to challenge it.  Likewise, if the 9th Circuit 
was correct that the entire executive order was unlawful because the president lacked the 
statutory authority to promulgate it, then the government’s interest in enforcing the order
as to all aliens would also be nil.  The government cannot act unlawfully, even if other parties
lack standing to challenge the government’s action. The Supreme Court’s per curiam decision,
which allows the order to be enforced against some aliens, does not support either conclusion.”).
219. See Marty Lederman, Back to the Supreme Court on the Scope of the Entry Ban 
Injunction: First Thoughts, JUST SECURITY (July 17, 2017, 8:10 AM), https://www.just
security.org/43191/supreme-court-scope-entry-ban-injunction-thoughts/ [https://perma.cc/
A46Z-HKUK].
220. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017) (“Accordingly,
the petitions for certiorari are granted, and the stay applications are granted in part.”); see 
also Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: A Day for Drama on the Bench, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017, 3:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/view­
courtroom-day-drama-bench/ [https://perma.cc/GM2G-TVVG].
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to whom relief could be entitled.221  The Court modified the breadth of
preliminary relief, tailoring the scope to redress those plaintiffs with perceived
legal grievances and others similarly situated.222  The Court concluded
that only those foreign nationals with a “credible claim of a bona fide 
relationship with a person or entity in the United States” could benefit
from the preliminary injunctions because those individuals are most likely
to have a “legally relevant hardship.”223  Not unsurprisingly the Court did
not cite Town of Chester, but implicit in the opinion was the idea that relief 
should benefit only those who have demonstrated a case or controversy.224 
To suggest otherwise nudges towards an advisory opinion.225 
The third upshot of Town of Chester is the demonstrable benefit inuring 
to defendants and the coordinate burdens placed on plaintiffs and the courts.
October Term 2016 provided several cases in which the Court declined to 
relax mainstream views on where a plaintiff could file a lawsuit.226  Some
commenters suggest that an animating principle from October Term 2016
is a trend toward “mak[ing] it more difficult for large groups of plaintiffs 
221. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (“But the injunctions reach
much further than that: They also bar enforcement of § 2(c) against foreign nationals
abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.  The equities relied on by the 
lower courts do not balance the same way in that context.  Denying entry to such a foreign
national does not burden any American party by reason of that party’s relationship with
the foreign national.  And the courts below did not conclude that exclusion in such circumstances
would impose any legally relevant hardship on the foreign national himself.”).
222. Id. at 2087–88. 
223. Id. at 2088.  But see Chris Hajec, Symposium: When (If Ever) May We Consider 
Religion at the Border?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 13, 2017, 3:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2017/07/symposium-ever-may-consider-religion-border/ [https://perma.cc/Z47C-8CW9]
(“Rather, the plaintiffs contend that their own rights, as Americans who are Muslim, are 
violated by President Donald Trump’s order suspending entry into the country by nationals
of six majority-Muslim countries.  This order, they claim, is based on religious animus and 
causes them to feel excluded from the American community because of their religion.”).
224. See Steve Vladeck, Symposium: How the Acting Solicitor General (Sort Of) 
Saved the Travel Ban, SCOTUSBLOG (July 12, 2017, 2:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/ 
symposium-acting-solicitor-general-sort-saved-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/BK8N-XACP]
(“Although many have suggested that the court’s interim June 26 ruling is proof that the 
justices are likely to side with the government on the merits if and when the time comes, 
the fact that a majority voted to leave the injunctions in place as applied to any non-citizen
with a ‘bona fide connection’ to the United States strongly implies the opposite.”). 
225. See Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 679 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“If either the plaintiff or the defendant ceases to have a concrete interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, there is no longer a live case or controversy.  A federal court that 
decides the merits of such a case runs afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions.”). 
226. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional
windfall to large multistate or multinational corporations that operate across many jurisdictions.
Under its reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject 
to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of 
incorporation.”). 
734
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to sue a corporate defendant in their state court of choice for conduct that 
harms consumers nationwide.”227  Others have expressed stronger sentiments
about a perceived constriction of access to the courts:
This anti-litigation bent is of a piece with a more general conservative skepticism
about the social value of litigation that has fueled a broad-ranging attack on our
civil justice system in recent decades.  The leaders of that assault have sought to
cast litigation as excessive and efficiency-killing, and litigation regimes as awash
in frivolous claims and bad-faith actors, even where the empirics suggest otherwise.
In cases like [California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities,
Inc.], the more measured view—that litigation is an imperfect but necessary regulatory
tool that compensates for the limited resources of enforcement agencies
and prosecutor’s offices—has mostly faded from view, along with any empirics
that might support it.  The Court’s procedural jurisprudence, in my view, is worse 
for it.228 
While Town of Chester offers another way for defendants to challenge
lawsuits and trim claims, the reformed burdens on plaintiffs are less apparent. 
“The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden
of establishing these elements.”229  Plaintiffs no doubt will have to marshal
evidence to justify individualized relief earlier in litigation.  And if courts 
interpret Town of Chester as requiring a threshold probe into Article III 
standing, some plaintiffs could be culled away without the benefit of
discovery.230  They can, of course, intervene later231—but that approach
is probably not a claimant’s preferred litigation strategy. Town of Chester
might sharpen the presentation of individualized harms when parties seek
unique relief, but that proof would have been necessary regardless for parties
readying for trial.  Town of Chester at least requires plaintiffs to articulate 
their individual case at earlier stages in litigation.  And the case may preclude
 227. MOLOLAMKEN, SUPREME COURT BUSINESS BRIEFING 1, 4 (July 2017), http://www.
mololamken.com/assets/htmldocuments/2017%20SCBB%20—%20Web%20Version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3X2C-B2Y3].
228.  David Freeman Engstrom, Presupposition and Procedure in CalPERS v. ANZ 
Securities, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE (July 11, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/ 
2017/07/11/presupposition-and-procedure-in-calpers-v-anz-securities/ [https://perma.cc/
V8QR-JRVS].
229. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). 
230. Cf. Lithwick, supra note 203 (“One of the principal hurdles for the plaintiffs here
will be, as Wright points out, the sufficiency of the evidence alleged.  The issue here is
that two fairly recent Supreme Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) dramatically heightened the requirements for pleading in civil 
cases in federal court.”).
231.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. 
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the inclusion of certain plaintiffs until discovery unfolds and intervention 
becomes necessary to secure individualized remedies. 
Just as Town of Chester adds more than a scintilla for plaintiffs to think 
about, the judiciary stands to endure inexorable administrative burdens. 
If parties seek damages in their names, or seek equitable relief tailorable 
to large groups, the court cannot use the one-good-plaintiff rule to 
administratively avoid addressing standing for all.  After Town of Chester, 
to rule without addressing how a decision affects parties with uncertain
standing is tantamount to an advisory opinion.232  Reliance on one injury
alone to prop up a multi-plaintiff lawsuit may constitute an unconstitutional
exercise of judicial power to the benefit or detriment of parties encumbered 
with indeterminate standing.233 Town of Chester projects upon federal courts
the obligation to review and ensure individualized cases and controversies
for each type of relief sought.  A court could take a pragmatic approach by
finding standing for one and ruling just for one.  But piecemeal litigation 
only goes so far.  In view of Town of Chester, a court might, for example, 
hesitate before finding standing for one and then ruling against all forms 
of relief. Certainly losing plaintiffs with yet-to-be-determined standing 
will complain of an advisory opinion against their interests.  They will argue 
that any such ruling should have no preclusive effect on their status as future 
litigants,234 and Town of Chester suggests that they might be right.  Courts
reduced to the status of “‘green-eyeshade accountants’ (or whatever
the contemporary equivalent is)”235 rooting out standing for all is not farfetched.
The interpretation, application, and evolution of Town of Chester will influence 
how courts approach cases with multiple sets of remedies across plaintiffs.
Town of Chester is a svelte legal development on its face, but it carries 
the auspice of a harbinger for upsetting expectations writ large for how 
courts and litigants approach standing in multi-plaintiff lawsuits.  The one-
good-plaintiff rule has just become the one-good-remedy rule.
 232. See Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 679 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).
233. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 194 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., 
dissenting).
234. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (“A person who was not a 
party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and
issues settled in that suit.  The application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus 
runs up against the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
in court.’” (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996))). 
235. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1187 (2017) (quoting
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)). 
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Frabjous236 celebration for defendants seeking to whittle down plaintiffs
is premature after Town of Chester, but a subdued chortle of eventual 
triumph is acceptable.  Town of Chester no doubt requires each plaintiff 
seeking individualized relief to have standing.  How courts interpret this
case when addressing individualized requests for damages and injunctive
relief will perforce impact how litigation is presented and how opinions
are written. Certainly linking at least one good plaintiff to each remedy avoids 
unconstitutional advisory opinions; yet tension exists between Town of
Chester and the cases before it, many of which simply require one good 
plaintiff to maintain—and sometimes win—the lawsuit.237  Justice Breyer
confronted the dilemma of what to do when substantive or procedural obstacles 
preclude vindication of a legal right, posing the following: “If you are 
cold, put on a sweater, perhaps an overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, 
but do not set fire to the house.”238  With time, all involved will know whether
the recalibration from the one-good-plaintiff rule to the one-good-remedy
rule merely turns up the heat for plaintiffs or effectively burns down multi-
party litigation amid procedural and administrative conflagration. 
236. I discovered the word “frabjous” while listening to a podcast in May 2017. The
Talking TED Talks Edition: Slate Money on Cathy O’Neil’s TED Talk, What Goes On
at TED Talks Conferences, and the Industry of Highly Paid Speeches, SLATE (May 6, 2017, 
2:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/moneybox/2017/05/cathy_o_neil_s_ted_
talk_what_goes_on_at_ted_talks_conferences_and_the_industry.html.  I am now dedicated
to promoting its usage. Frabjous, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (Michael Agnes ed., 
4th ed. 2003) (“splendid”).
237. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 586 (4th Cir. 2017); 
Texas, 809 F.3d at 150, 155. 
238.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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